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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

:\ATE OF T"TAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
10349

:.un:s COLEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant James Coleman appeals from a convic'. n fur the crime of issuing a check against insufficient
:.i:~ Ill \iolation of Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annoia!to(i, 1953, in the Seventh Judicial District Court for San
: .Ill! County.

1
2
DISPOSITIO~ I~ LOWER Cl

•nn

The appellant was tried on the crime ··h
" ar11.,.,J,
information on jury trial at Monticello, l"t<th, "!' :~,.
day of December, 1964. The jury returni·<i , , "~"; .
guilty on that date. On January 19. 196;1, th·· .irr.-·.
was sentenced to be committed to the l "tah ~tat.. ;·. _
but a stay of execution of the judl[TT1ent 1\·;..., •111 11 .,1 ,..J .. ::
February 16. On February 16, l 96i1, the n•urt dl'.rt··:
motion for a new trial and nrdered c11mm1tm .. nt '.· ..
Utah State Prison. Subsequently, on ).larch lti. 1%:•. ''.·
court denied appellant's motion for reconsidnation , ,. ··.
motion for new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT OK APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should r)I' a.
firmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following :rtatemen:

facts:
The appellant called Richard Perkins. a stockman ;
San Juan County, Utah, and inquired whether 11 r r"t :.·
had cattle for sale ( T. 5). This was un or about tht> ::-.:
day of February, 1964. Approximately the next da!· l"t
appellant went to the home of )Ir. Perkins in Blandi!li:
examine the cattle ( T. 5). After examining the cattit. ~
appellant called Mr. Perkins again by phone. and an ~
price on the sale of the cattle was reached f T. G) · I~ n·
agreed that the appellant would take 45 head of ltr. p~:

r
3
. ,ml
. i pav
. Perkins the sum of $4,620, which sum

ittll'

. :•~I

a small amount for hay (T. 6, 7).

,, ne c·:ittle were loaded. branded, and inspected; and
.iP:-i.·llant pn.' )Ir. Perkins a check in the amount of
;'. ,·~, 1 Exhibit I, T. i).
The appellant took the cattle,
··'. ~Ir. Perkins deposited the check with his bank in
.. ~,.JD~ f T. :. ; ) The check was apparently returned for

proper endol'S('ment by the Fruita State Bank of
f-~i:a. Colorado, upon which it was drawn. After redeposit
... rii11Ck wa~ n>tumed tx>cause of insufficient funds (T. 8,
~u~·quently. ~Ir. Perkins contacted the appellant, and
·~· .. ;•pt·llant ;;aid he would send a cashier's check, but
.. r d;d 1T. JO). A letter (Exhibit 2), along with a
-., h 1fate<l ~fa_,. 16, 1964, was sent to Perkins. Perkins
.c;....: tt.1: bank concerning that check and was advised
>N; wa..s nn account (T. 10).
• • . .; ,i

[~Jnald A.

Turner. an employee of the Fruita State

;.mk of Fruita, Colorado, testified that the appellant op-~"'! a bank account at that bank on March 6, 1964, and

•'.lo·,'ltt"ti with the hank the sum of $5,800 (T. 43, 51).
~ 11 •-'""'r, on that date, the appellant had approximately
r. um worth of checks outstanding ( T. 56). When the
-~~ic ici"en hy appellant to l\f r. Perkins was returned on
l!.s"th l:! to the Fruita State Bank, the appellant had on
~ixosit unly $2.691.69 (T. 56). At no time did the appel..nt satisfy the check. The appellant did not take the
~nor call any witnesses in his own behalf.

Baaed upon the above evidence, the appellant was con-

lc:ted of the crime charged.
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ARGU.\IENT
POIXT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ClHL\llT l'P.t
JUDICIAL ERROR I~ REINSTRl"f'TJ:\c T:i~
JURY SUBSEQUENT TO ITS RETikE.\1£\The appellant contends that thP trial c.. urt u•!'l."', :prejudicial error in instructin~ the jury wh.,r. u.••·
subsequent to starting its deliberations. Mclrnt-0 :,. ••
quest additional instructions ( T. 6i).' Th+> f, •rem.in ·'. -:.
jury indicated the jury's desire to haw Instructi .. 11 \
explained and to have certain questions cnncemin~ :! ·.:
swered.
Instruction No. 4 ( R. 10) required the Jury '.• '..:.:
beyond a rea8onablc doubt that at the time of the ~.:..
and delivery of the check from the appellant ti• Put:.
the appellant had an intent to defraud. and ~ '.:·
check knowing that at the time there was not suff1clt'~'.
funds or credit in the drawee bank for payment upon ·.'.i
check's presentation. The jury was expressly ad\·ised tr.i'.
the issuance of a check a~ainst insufficient funds 11 ~
prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud "unle5~ f!"'C.
all the evidence in the case [the jury entertaint><i l •• :-e~"'·:·
able doubt as to whether [the defendant l had the inte:>::
defraud at the time of making- and deliVl'rinl!' !'UCfl cht'l.k The court, upon return of the jury. instn.ic~j theo.:
concerning Instruction No. 4 and ashd the jury :i ttr

1Tbe respondent

bas no information

mans~•

to bow th~ p1m
• :.Iii> ...,_..
in the record came to be there, and respt"rtfully submits tha~ ~ -="'
should disregard any inference that might bu-e been U1tlm
·
markings.
llS

5

f•ll'll' .. ti .. tlll'red them (T. 68). The foreman
· ·11·l•··it1•d tint
tht'\.• did not, but that the pres.,.n. l!I'
•
. ··1.~'ti•' 11 as tlw questi .. n The court then carefully
. >1 !h•' iur~· that prt>sentation meant presentation
.. .:rnh. 11 .. t tn the payee, and that when the defendant
. ·n•· l hPek t1. the pa~·Pt.>, he must know that he doesn't
. 11 ,,;i. ·' in ttlt' hank sufficient to pay the check upon its
"n·m· nt t" th1· hank l T. flX). Further, the court ex.. ,,,, 1 '" tlw J ur~· what prima facie means, indicating
:· .. t •: m··;1n,; ,.nty that the evidence creates a reasonable
:."r,·nn" in t 11l' absence of proof to the contrary ( T. 69).
~·-i1,1. th1. c11urt instructed the jury that evidence of lack
: wd~ at th·· timP the check is written raises a prim&
,_,. nfrM1rP .,fan intent to defraud (T. 69).
.111
. n'·i
...

l;j, originally given by the court, ad:}•ni.;ht'd th~· jury to weigh the evidence fully in light of
.. '.ht• fact." pm~ented. Instruction No. 13 advised the jury
"".<! the~ had a right to consider "all the circumstances
,~·Tnundin!! thl' occurrences ref erred to" in the case. In~r"Jction ~11. 11 carefully advised the jury as to the mean~-7 1f rea..,.onable doubt and the necessity of finding the
.:cu..~·~ Jlllilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The court also
.:.str'Jrt..t'd 11n the presumption of innocence (Instruction
i · : 11 1 and spec:ifically on the requirement of an intent to
:~·r.iud I Instruction No. 3). The jury was also instructed
:·;,! thfl Stat" borl' the burden of proving all the elements
',;. ff
..... '·' ense I Instruction No. 2).
!nstr11L'tion

~t•.

At th" time of the reinstruction to the jury, the only
·lC(';Jti•)n ta.ken was that the court's reference to prima

facie, in the absence of an explanatinn n,,,._ •: .....
could be considered, was error (T. 71 ). Fir1.>.:,
be noted that the court read the "-tattiti· '.! ·\·.
offense to the JUry, appan•ntly w1th11ut .r.J ..\ t;. r
70).
At the time of the appellant's ffi••t1· •L ,., 1 .
Judge Keller entered a Memorandum D1·t· 1 ~ 1 . r: ~" 1 ,.
explained the basis of his instructions and 1• 1.\ r.
new trial should be denied on a chim .. j 1nstrJ,:;
error (R. 25-3). Judge Keller wrotp:
"Without detailing th(' e\'i<lenct' rrspf'C~::;~ ·.:
account of the defendant with tht• FnJ!~1 :-r...1
Bank upon which the chi:>ck P'Miltin)l m tn.. t~ .• •
in this case was drawn. it W:l.-" discl11s1•n m tr.. ..
dence that at the time the cht>ck was fir.;t pr,,sc~.·
for payment the defendant had drawn "th"r 1 : ..., •
upon the same account which, tP~E>ther w:t" :
check upon which the charge is base.i, woui~ ·~·.
overdrawn the account by some two th.rnsan11 .:
lars. It would seem tn me that one may saft'i, ...~
sume that this evidence was taken into account:-:
the jury on the question of his intent at the rw
he drew the check. • • •''
It is submitted that, taking the instructions as a wh· ~
the jury could not have been misled and no errnr w~ "!".:mitted. It is well settled in this State that in considtm;
whether the trial court has committed errnr in instrur::~.r
the jury the instructions given should be cnns1derl'<l ·•' ··
whole. See State v. 1~fcCn11. l;; l'tah 136. i9 P:tc •.:
.
.
6- ')"'1 p .,,1 !'
(1897); State v. Hendn"rk.~. 123 T tah 2 '· -·1 c- · - · · State v. E1·ans, 107 t•tah 1, l.'>l P :.!d 196 In Stat. \ ·'
dou1ay, 61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 96~ t 1922). this rou~ n..r,·

7

.. • • • When instructions as a whole fairly
nrt'~t·nt thl' law. clearly present ~he. i~sues involved,
1
• ., ·n nu harmful or preJud1c1al errors, the
1
,1,J1 n1n-."
.....
i·
··t
'n
The statute
._,.n IL • "., criminal case must stand.
•
• •
·'Jat pr11 \·ides that technical errors m cnmmal cases
.. 11 !l(> disre~arded is mandatory, and, unless upon
11
' , "rt'\"JPW of all the evidence we are sa t"is f.ie d th a t
. rniscarriai.re of justice has resulted, we have no
rii;rht tu interfere with the jury's verdict. * * *"
11 ,,

.~unmitted that when the instructions in the in-

:..r.t ,;...'<· are so \·iewed it cannot be claimed that the jury
~·

!"1".1'iled.
i'.

15

well settled that references to burden of proof

· · '.h• ··fft·d .. f prima facie evidence are not rendered
.rf•'J.!iu:J wherP uther instructions make it clear that the
.'i 1·
:;.;i-

:<·

.~~

··on:-ider all the facts and circumstances in the
:!:IA. C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1323, pp. 819-

v. Sawyrr. 54 P. 276, 182 P. 206 (1919), the
.. :;ie!lant complained that an instruction on larceny phrased
.. the laniruage of the statute on recent possession being
--::na iactt· eddence of jluilt was error. This court re'1."!t1l '.hat contention. but noted that when the instructions
: ·"': f)r tht> court were \·iewed as a whole, it was clear
1
"'.i· hc· iury was ~ven sufficient latitude to consider all
·:~ facts an<l circumstances in determining the appellant's
:'Ji~ In Stati- V. Dnrwrnn. i7 lT. 343, 294 P. 1108 (1931),
·~ m~truction similar to that given in the Sawyer case, re-4":;n£ tn Prima facie evidence of guilt, was claimed as
-:- r ••n appeal. The court stated :
·.:: In

.\fn.t1

·• • • • While the instruction in question
stated that the unexplained possession of recently

·
stolen propt.'rtv
was prim·l
f ' 1I . 1I' I.'\ !1h•Jl\'1
•
'
the st:.ltement was mat1·riall~ quali: II·•:. ..
1
putl'd,
furtlwr chargl' that ~t1l .f.. ..1r,'.)"
. I by thL•
.
1
enc ence, chd . not rt>lit'W thL· ""'t·,1t i·· r· 1."m l•r· •··
·
..
fenctant s $.!llllt lwrond a rt>a.,on;il.li d'"ii,t ..
su~h possession, l'Vt>ll th11u".+1
ur1t ''°!I·
. .' ···
"'
.• I . l l.,t'i I
alone sufficit'nt to warrant ;1 , ,. 11 , 1, ''."' •
such possession might h1• hri:er'
, ..
·
<
•
1·r·t
• 1
with other circumstance;:.;, •·tr."
· ·
1·11r , -. •
1

A similar n'sult "·as n·aclwd h~' tlii.; r11urt 11i .'\1.11, ..
,
' .
105 U. 162, 1-13 P. 2d -191 ( l~lll). Thi· 1·11u 11 ;•. '> H.
case madt• it clPar that wlH·n· till' J11n i.- ··lii•·ni.•-. ..
'

as to the necessity of considt•ring all

trw

f'!trr.•·n:·

crime as against all the evidenn· prl'SPnted. a r•·frri-r:
the

term "prima facie" is not pn•judit:ial.

It seems to be settled law in this Statr that wh1 r
trial court, as in the instant casP, in.-:truct" tht• ·lit:> . ~::;.
necessity of considering all the evidt·nct., :rn•l 11 !lt'l'I'

:·.·

instructions when taken as a whole make it ,·!tm tha: t:·
court has not deprived the jury of

eon~iderin~ rdt'1·";·

evidence in determining the accust•<f .s guilt.

pr•:i~d1::...

error would not be found.
The appellant argues that the instruc:t1 1 ·n,;

a~

r···

by the court, in effect, deprived him 11f the deft':l:'t ,,; r·"
sonable expectation of payment. It should i 1(· r.-•tt.•i '."...
the appellant made no request for such an

i1L't!"\li.'tJ •

neither at the time of the original instruc:ti ns t·• tr.•· -0

nor at the time of reinstructi11n to tht· Jury· It ;~ ,ipjW' •·
that the appellant's defense at the timt' .,f trial w;..., ·..~..upon a claimed lack of intent t11 defraud. Tht· rl'; ...- :.. ..
expectation theory is only one means ' 1f r·ha!lt'mr.n: ..

•
9
,,
1

:"! .iud. ~('t' :2:! Am Jur., Fa/.-;r Pretenses, Sec.

_ , . ,ppt llaut .ud ncit n'qut>st an instruction on the

:·e,t...;onal>lt· t>Xpectation of payment, but relied
.... !" .• Lt' 1.. \·itiatl' the State's contention of an intent
....'""
, ,.. :h" argunwnt no\\' raised on appeal is extran• , t fr .. pnsture .,f the case at the time of trial. The
.,, ,> :·.. r ti" ;qqwllant's claim of prejudice would be
-. .• • , 1 , ~rial c11t111.'s instruction had somehow advised the
r •i "' :h1• 1•h-nwnt of intent to defraud was no longer
: ... :1 ,. llJ"'11 \\ hid1 reasonable men could differ. It is
1 _. ,;,; th.it t111· .ll1r.\· was not confused on that issue, since
.. v <i· ·ll~ ' ' ' re directed only to the issue of presenta'

.u

!'. > .ipparent that the presentation issue was foremost

mind in determining whether the appellant
..: :i11 n,.1uisitt> intent to defraud. It is well settled that
.. :i .1pptilant cannot seek to avoid his conviction by claiming
·:..it :it thl' timl· the check was written, he had sufficient
:::· nt:. in tht• bank to cover it, if at the same time there
· ·r1 "u:standin~ additional checks in excess of his bank
.. ::.n.:t. :!~ Am ..Jur., Faist Pnfrns<'S, Sec. 66, states:
;he 1:iry's

"* * • According to some authority, a statuh· making it criminal for a person, with intent to
dt>fraud. to draw or deliver to another a check on a
hank. knowing at tht' time that he has not sufficient
f 1n:ds in. nr credit with, the bank to meet the check,
j, \·inlat<><i liy the i.riving of a check with money in
th .. hank in t•xcess of its amount, where the drawer
has previously directed the bank to stop payment on
all checks of a class including the check in question.
'
.,

..

10
See also Prince v. State, 93 Texas r. nm1na1
. .
S. W. 863 (1923); Huffman v. Stafr i;;i· ""
-· '•.. ;·
, ca '" E ,.,, .
diana, 1933), where the courts sustain :I . • •·J! : ·
.
e< C< n\1ct1• r
fact situations similar to that in the 1·n··ta.
· ···
:s nt cas.·
When the instructions are examined as . ·h
it \\ "'~ •
apparent that appellant has no basis on wh· h , ...
·)n

1

•

lC

vi r~

error before this court. Further. it appears tha~ j,. .
pellant is arguing a different theorv• of defen•n
. •.u.x nn :&~i)".;.
than that presented at the time of trial

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABl'SE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GRAXT A
NEW TRIAL, SINCE:
A.

THE MOTION WAS NOT TIMELY PRESENTED.

B.

THE NE\VL Y DISCOVERED EVIDEXCE
WAS READILY AVAILABLE iLt\D COl1.D
HA VE BEEN PRESENTED AT TRIAL
HAD DUE DILIGENCE BEE:S EXERCISED.

Appellant contends that the trial court commiUi':
error in refusing to grant a motion for a new trial iY'
is no merit to this contention.
A. The record reflects that the jury's guilty verdr'.
to the information as charged was returned on DecOr
10, 1964. The appellant filed his own motion for 1 llf'I'
trial on December 15 1964 (R 16). The motion~·
'
.
~
new trial on two grounds, one of which waa newlJ

11
,-. : ,ndt'nCl'. On January 19, 1965, the court entered its

sentencinl{ the appellant to the Utah State Prison,
, , ,. n ,,i exec utiun of the judgment until February 16,
' - .......
;'.1,,·,
(in February 16, 1965, the court heard the matter
··"' ~. rr.. ,ti11n for a new trial. The court denied the motion for
:, r.f'\• tnal ( R. ~:1). On March 16, 1965, the court denied
·:, ~.i':h· m11ti11n for a new trial having taken the matter
. ~ •-·..:11n_;;id1·rntiun at the request of new counsel ( R. 24).
\:·:·"i:i"·it,.; in support of the motion for a new trial were
~ '. f:ied until ~farch 16, 1965 (R 20, 21).
,,: "llt'EI
~

-·

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, allows
· .. •'"ttrt ti. )lrant a motion for a new trial on the basis of
'"'' 1)· 1:isc11\·ered evidence material to the defendant's case
1"1:1rft n1uJJ not have been discovered and produced at trial
·' :'.'; ML..~mable diligence. In the instant case, the motion
.;1' ttmt'ly file<l by the appellant within five days after the
· ~ ill't. a,; re4uired by Section 77-38-4, Utah Code AnnoLt·-i. 19:1:~. However, affidavits were not presented until
:.Lrcn 16, 1963. Section 77-38-3, Utah Code Annotated,
:'·~.:. rt'(!uire!' that affidavits be produced at the hearing
r. 'Lf:'µort of a motion for a new trial. Section 77-88-4,
l.'tah C xie Annotated, 1953, requires that the affidavits be
!>t'r;t:'d and filed within 30 days after the filing of the
:.1it1ee uf motion. This was not done in the instant case.
F1> L'nurt dt·nied the motion for a new trial on February
ii:. l~t4l.1. The court was well \\;thin legitimate bounds in
·!..r.ymg thl· motion because of the failure of the appellant
:.. *rw affidavits within the statutory period.
St'<.·t1•in 77-:i~3(7).

1

Havini;t" denied the motion on the 16th day of Febru·~· 196,). the court was thereafter without jurisdiction

I:.!

to reconsider the mattl>r 11r to grant app.·IJ; 111 t 1 ..... "' • .
tion for new trial In Sf11f1 \'. Canu, 1; t l . ::s ... ~:·1 !' '
this court ruled that a S('<:nnd moti1111 f11r a 11 ,.i1 .... ·. •{•
months after the time for filing th•· m"' '' ,11 • .,, ,
has expired was propt•rly dl•nit-d. Thi· m11tj,, 11 ;n tl, .• ..
case, havinJl; been denil'C) "n f't·bruar:- 11;, I ~11).-,, l•lu.: ~.
be renewed by petition for n•c11n.-.:idt·rati11n t11 !it· h,,,1,.,, •
a substantial time thereaftt'r. Thl' court'.; ~l•m .. r...........
•. : ~
Decision ( R. :25) reflects that counst>l f11r th 1• ap 1 >i,l!;i~.: "'.
ample notice of the hearing on the m11t1nn f••r n1·1• rn~ ,,.
on February 16, 1965. The trial court in that )ft•rn,.,...._,c. ~
Decision doubted its power to reconsider the mot 1, r. :,';.•
having denied it and, thus, recoJmiZt•d tht' rult· in the (a
case and the statement in Staff' v. Whif•. IO'i r. ~. r.2~·
2d 80, where this court observed that a "St>Cond rnutwn::
a new trial was not timely made and the trial court "l.i
without jurisdiction to entertain it."
•.

j1

.).·,,

.,..

Based upon the above procedural irre~larities. ::
submitted the trial court properly rejected the motl"D : :
a new trial.

B. Appellant claims that the evidence allegt'(i t" ~J;
been newly discovered required the granting of a ne,. :T'.i.
It is well settled that a motion for a new trial ~ pn:u:·
ily in the sound discretion of the trial court. ~ S't~· ·
Monfgoml'ry, 37 U. 515, 109 P. 815 (1910). The trial C'.C
has had the opportunity to view the witnesses and iPP!"~
the evidence at first hand and, therefore. is in a is=
better position to determine whether the newly diJroft!I'

r
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is. in fact. newly discovered, _and ,wheth~r it would
.... ~ubstantial effect on the Jury s verdict.
::,i1 r n.•··· a •
.
.
.
In tlw inS'bnt case, it 1s submitted that the trial court
. • . L.,u ....•• 1t.-; disaetion. The evidence which was said
''tl r.. l~ .ir
<tltllCt.'

.. •,. r;, 1, 1 ~ disct1\·t>n•d was a phone call made by the appel-

.. ~.: ;.. )Ir. Rnbert Sawyt'r uf the First National Bank of

P·Jr.•~ur" (\ 1Jorado, to determine whether or not the check
:· ~ $."i.l\.~l. which was received by the appellant and de-

:• ~itt-J :n th• Bank nf Fruita, Colorado, would be good (R.
:•i Thi·n· 1s n•• question but that this evidence was read,:r a\'ail:lble at the time of trial. It is acknowledged in the
J.ffidimt 11f the appellant that he related the evidence of

conversation to his counsel prior to trial ( R. 21). Cer'.llr.ly the appellant, who made the phone call, was well
;nre of ha\;ng made the same and the contents thereof.
t~cier thest' circumstances, it is apparent that this evidence
is Mt newly disco\'ered so as to warrant the granting of a
~;:w trial. In State V. Weai•er, 78 U. 555, 6 P. 2d 167
:~~·

l'.fll), this court noted:

"Newly discovered evidence, to be ground for
a new trial, must satisfy several elementary requirements. The courts are not in accord respecting alJ
these requirements, but fairly agree that the newly
d1Slwered evidence be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial, that it be not merely cumulative,
and that it be such as to render a different result
Probable on the retrial of the case."
In Staff v. Moon" 41 U. 247 ( 1912), this court denied
.:.. lPIJellant's claim that a new trial should have been
l'T'allted

based upon newly discovered evidence where it

14
was clear that the evidence could have l>et-n _..,_('rt.t1r,.
"'"" . ·
the time of trial with reasonabll' dilijl('nce.
· ·' ·
In State v. Martint·z. lG C. 2d :303, 392 P. :!d ·~~ 1 .,.._,
this court, in denying that the trial court t·rn i . ·· '

to grant a new trial, observed :

.... l. 1~. ,; ..

"There was no showing nf newly di5e";. •.
evidence ?n the quest.ion of insanit~-. whicn r''i" '.
a new t.r1al. The endence shows that th .. aii·:..
now rehed on for such evidence as t.• his sani'."
the same one who was investi~atm~ deiPM.u.:
sanity for the defendant's previous attornH. ' t...
there is no showing that the alienist mai.i\· alil 'l .
discoveries after the trial. • • •"
·
Finally, it is submitted that the claimed newly di.;i· ,.
ered evidence could have no effect upon the jur;-"5 Wro.t'..
The jury was well aware of the fact that there wa.; ..;
deposit the sum of $5,800 in the Fruita State Bank ti• tl:•
credit of the appellant at the time the check was first pr>sented. The theory of the prosecution was that the defr:·
dant's intent to defraud was shown by the many outs:.ar.:ing checks in excess of the amount on deposit. and th.>t '.··
deposit, when viewed in the light of the claims a~r.s: ·was merely a ruse to cull subsequent persons inquirin~ :~'.
the matter into the belief that the appellant's moti'"e; ,..,.~.
negligent, though honest. The evidence which the appeli&:"
claims to have been newly discovered would ha\'e aJJ.,.
nothing to the posture of the case as it was submitted :
the jury.
The trial court itself in its Memorandum J)eci.aioo 1t
'· dl1'
25) noted the fact that the evidence was hardly oew.r
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·""": r.or could ha\·e affected the jury's verdict. It is
. , ;:'.ed that this conclusion is correct and that there is
11
: , :.....-~~ flir a claim of error in denying the appellant a new

CO~CLVSION

Tht' appellant seeks reversal of his conviction because

instructional errors and failure of the trial court
zr.,.n: him a new trial. An analysis of these claims makes
:: "~ar that they have no legal merit. The appellant's forum
• r ·iattlt' was the trial court. That was the place for a
,;i.._., l•i uus nature to be won or lost. The jury appeared
n11:iced that the appellant acted in violation of the ap?tlC1tlie law, and the appellant himself does not challenge
·:.- •ufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury's ver1:,~ wa.s based. The errors claimed for reversal on appeal
~~:ow· tv h.ave little relationship as to whether essential
. ust1r~ was done.
... ,..i."l;'(l

This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General,
Attorney for Resp<Jflden.t.

